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Supreme Court of Canada 
Constitutional Cases 2007:  
Defining Access to Justice  
Patricia Hughes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Access to justice” is a broad concept that not only encompasses 
physical and financial access to courts and tribunals, but may include 
any developments in law or practice that allow people to enforce their 
rights, protect themselves from diminution of their rights or otherwise 
defend themselves legally, and the use of the legal system to claim a 
share in the “goods” and realization of the values that are said to 
characterize Canadian society.  
A paper written about the use of technology as relevant to access to 
justice defines access to justice as asserting a claim or defence, or 
creating, enforcing, modifying or discharging a legal obligation, 
acquiring information about the courts or tribunals or the process, 
participating in proceedings, as well as a just and transparent process 
that includes “among other things, timeliness and affordability” and 
allows evaluation of “all aspects [of the justice system’s operations], 
particularly its fairness, effectiveness and efficiency”.1 
To this definition, in one sense extensive, but in another limited to 
the legal system and legal rights, I would add that the results of efforts to 
increase access to justice must be not only technically successful, but 
substantively meaningful. Perhaps the most basic understanding of the 
concept is that economic status should not affect the ability to “access 
justice”. In other words, that while no one may be explicitly prevented 
from filing a lawsuit, defending him or herself or claiming discriminatory 
or ill treatment at the hands of government, for example, the right has 
                                                                                                             
*
  Patricia Hughes, formerly the Dean of Law at the University of Calgary, is the Executive 
Director of the Law Commission of Ontario. 
1
 Washington State Access to Justice Technology Principles (Adopted by the Washington 
State Supreme Court December 3, 2004), online at: <http://www.wsba.org/atj/thewashingtonstate 
accesstojusticetechnologyprinciplesasadopted3.doc>.  
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little meaning if one cannot afford the process of doing so effectively. 
Barriers to access do not lie only in court processes or otherwise in the 
legal system itself, however, and they are not only financial; they may be 
found in people’s sociological and psychological circumstances. For 
example, one study of the use by abused women in immigrant 
communities indicated that 
[m]ost participants identified the interplay of cultural norms and 
structural oppression as very profound barriers to the justice system for 
abused immigrant women. All the women, no matter what their 
country of origin, described their social lives as deeply rooted in 
patriarchal structures. Structural constraints, such as language barriers, 
perceived racism in the criminal justice system and social service 
agencies, and a lack of adequate ethnocultural services and representation 
were also identified as disincentives to seeking help in cases of abuse.   
Participants cited dependency on the abuser for financial support 
and immigration sponsorship as another major barrier. As well, most of 
the women stated that a lack of knowledge of criminal and civil legal 
protection in cases of abuse served as a disincentive to contacting the 
justice system. They indicated they would not contact the police if they 
needed assistance and protection from a violent husband or partner, or 
would do so only in very extreme cases of physical violence.2  
Many of the factors identified in the above passage could be 
alleviated if the legal system were sufficiently responsive to the full 
reality of these women’s lives; to achieve this goal, in finding 
“solutions” to domestic violence, law must take into account not only the 
criminal act of assault, but the need for “mediation” of cultural context, 
the development of trust, provision of information in an effective way 
and the need for resources to assist with employment and housing. The 
way the law interacts with immigrant women who have been subject to 
violence is merely one illustration of the broader understanding of access 
to justice. Seen this way, “access to justice” includes not only non-
constitutional areas of law, but also a wide variety of constitutional 
cases, including, for example, equality decisions; for some purposes, one 
might include at least some of these cases in any discussion of access to 
justice jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                             
2
  Baukje Miedema & Sandra Wachholz, A Complex Web: Access to Justice for Abused 
Immigrant Women in New Brunswick (March 1998), at 6, online at: <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/ 
pubs/pubspr/complexweb/complexweb_e.html#summary>. 
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Several decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada relate to these 
various understandings of access to justice. I will assess two decisions 
that involve the basic question of financial barriers to accessing the legal 
system, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie3 and Little 
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Commissioner of Customs 
and Revenue),4 one decision dealing with a procedural matter, Alliance 
for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.)5 and one decision that raises a 
broader conception of access to justice that involves potentially 
conflicting equality and religious claims: Bruker v. Marcovitz.6 Another 
decision that falls into this category, Hislop v. Canada, where the 
meaning of “full justice”, deals with whether the declaration that a 
statutory provision is unconstitutional is both prospective and 
retroactive.7 The Supreme Court held that it would be only rarely that the 
remedy would be retroactive to when the relevant provision of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms8 came into force and that 
Hislop was not that rare case. Hislop is discussed at length elsewhere in 
this volume and I do not consider it further. 
II. THE DECISIONS 
1.  No One May Sleep under Bridges — But Not Everyone Needs To  
Christie9 is an access to justice case in the most minimalist or basic 
sense, since it is concerned with the financial ability of litigants to obtain 
effective representation in court and with the related or obverse issue of 
the capacity of lawyers to represent low-income litigants as their regular 
work. Christie challenged, unsuccessfully, whether taxing legal services 
is a denial of the rule of law and the Charter. Christie illustrates the 
principle that how one frames the issue can more or less dictate the 
result, or, one might say, an example of how a little more access to 
justice (or more modestly, the legal system) can be denied because the 
                                                                                                             
3
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”]. 
4
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters (No. 2)”].  
5
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 40, 2007 SCC 40 (S.C.C.). 
6
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.). 
7
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
8
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].  
9
  Supra, note 3. 
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court chooses to treat it as a big increase in access to justice (or the legal 
system).  
Fifteen years ago, British Columbia enacted the Social Service Tax 
Amendment Act (No. 2), 199310 imposing a 7 per cent tax on legal fees, 
the only professional fees so taxed. This legislation was a response to a 
judicial finding that predecessor legislation was ultra vires under section 
7 of the Charter on grounds of vagueness.11 Ostensibly, the tax was 
intended to fund legal aid; however, the proceeds were included in the 
province’s general revenue and it was not possible to track whether, as 
the Supreme Court of Canada said, “how much (if any) of the tax 
collected was put towards legal aid, or other initiatives aimed at 
increasing access to justice”.12  
The facts were sympathetic, since Christie was a lawyer who served 
poor and low-income people and charged these clients low fees. An 
earlier challenge had been unsuccessful because, although the Court of 
Appeal held that there was a constitutional right to access to the legal 
system, it found that there was no evidence to show that anyone was 
denied that right because of the tax.13 Christie sought to remedy that 
deficiency by adducing affidavit evidence from individuals who stated 
that the tax prevented their obtaining legal advice and from himself 
about the debilitating effect on his practice of the tax.14 Christie also 
maintained that he had to take the tax out of the fees he was already 
charging, rather than add it to his fees, because his clients did not want 
                                                                                                             
10
  S.B.C. 1993, c. 24. 
11
  The Social Service Tax Amendment Act, 1992 provided that legal fees were subject to the 
Social Service Tax Act, with some exceptions, including where there was not a “connection” 
between the legal services and British Columbia. The legislation was challenged by the B.C. Branch 
of the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA BC”) and the Law Society of British Columbia, and the 
Court held the “connection” provision to be vague: Canadian Bar Assn., British Columbia Branch v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] B.C.J. No. 407, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 410 (B.C.S.C.). In 
response, the legislature enacted the statute at issue in Christie, which the Law Society and CBA-
BC challenged, unsuccessfully, on the basis that the tax it provided for was not a direct tax and 
therefore ultra vires the province: Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
[1994] B.C.J. No. 1013, 91 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (B.C.S.C.). Yet another challenge to the legislation, 
by an individual lawyer, was also unsuccessful: John Carten Personal Law Corp. v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] B.C.J. No. 2460, 40 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 (B.C.C.A.), application 
for leave to appeal dismissed, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 205 [hereinafter “John Carten, Personal Law 
Corp.”]. The history is taken from Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2005] B.C.J. 
No. 217, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 728, 2005 BCSC 122 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Christie (B.C.S.C.)”]. 
12
  Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 1. 
13
  John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra, note 11, at paras. 12-14. 
14
  Nevertheless, the Court in Christie implies that even had it found that there is a general 
right to counsel, it would have dismissed the case because of an inadequate evidentiary record: 
Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 28. 
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to or, more to the point, could not, pay larger fees. Because his clients 
often did not pay him or were late in paying him, he was faced with 
paying the tax out of his low income. He could not or did not pay the tax 
and the provincial government seized moneys from his bank account. 
The chambers judge accepted as fact that 
… some of Mr. Christie’s clients could not obtain needed legal 
services if Mr. Christie did not act for them … if Mr. Christie were to 
charge them his hourly rate plus the social services tax, they could not 
pay him … if Mr. Christie is not paid the minimum amount which he 
charges, in most of his cases he could not continue to practice law, thus 
denying those individuals access to justice.15   
In addition to accepting the affidavit evidence, the chambers judge also 
took notice of her own experience with unrepresented litigants to 
conclude that “many self-represented individuals in a wide variety of 
cases are denied effective access to justice when they cannot afford 
appropriate legal representation”.16 
Christie also deposed that the costs of running his practice increased 
because he had to hire a part-time bookkeeper and take more time from 
his practice to supervise the accounting. Justice Koenigsberg was less 
responsive to the inconvenience and administrative costs Mr. Christie 
argued that he faced because of the tax than to the financial barriers to 
the clients, saying that these facts were not determinative of the 
constitutionality of the tax.  
The Court of Appeal in the earlier Carten case thought that if they 
found that the tax prevented people from retaining lawyers, legal aid 
would be available to these potential litigants.17 In Christie, the chambers 
judge pointed out that Mr. Christie’s clients did not qualify for legal aid 
because they had “modest incomes” and she “inferred” from the 
evidence in the case, “buttressed by common knowledge in the courts, 
that legal aid is no longer widely available, if it ever was, to all litigants 
except those charged with criminal offences”.18 
In reaching the conclusion that the tax was unconstitutional, 
Koenigsberg J. had characterized the issue she had to decide narrowly, 
explicitly rejecting the broader characterization proposed by counsel for 
the Attorney General:  
                                                                                                             
15
  Christie (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 82. 
16
  Id., at para. 74. 
17
  John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra, note 11, at para. 14. 
18
  Christie (B.C.S.C.), supra, note 11, at para. 80. 
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The issue of the tax is not whether the government must provide and 
pay for legal counsel in any matter requiring legal services, but 
whether the state can impose an additional financial burden on those 
seeking to obtain legal services.19   
Thus she held that the tax was unconstitutional to the extent that it 
applied to services provided low income people, that is, persons below 
the level of assets and income defined by the Family Duty Counsel 
Program.20  
The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, 
proceeding on the basis that the case was simply about whether the tax 
on legal services was unconstitutional, not whether the government has 
an obligation to provide affordable legal services.21 
Taking the position that certain core aspects of access to justice are 
constitutionally guaranteed, Newbury J.A., for the majority in the Court 
of Appeal, defined “core aspects of access to justice” as follows: 
… reasonable and effective access to courts of law and the opportunity 
to obtain legal services from qualified professionals, that are related to 
the determination and interpretation of legal rights and obligations by 
courts of law or other independent tribunals.22   
Members of the judiciary have stressed the importance of the ability 
of litigants to effective access to the legal system and thus to justice in 
other contexts, as well. For example, McLachlin C.J.C. has observed 
that: 
The most advanced justice system in the world is a failure if it 
does not provide justice to the people it is meant to serve. Access to 
justice is therefore critical. Unfortunately, many Canadian men and 
women find themselves unable, mainly for financial reasons, to access 
                                                                                                             
19
  Id., at para. 81. 
20
  Id. Justice Koenigsberg said that she would have granted a declaration “that the Act is 
ultra vires legal services provided for the enforcement or protection of civil or criminal law 
constitutional rights regardless of the income level,” but was bound by Carten in which the majority 
of the Court of Appeal decided otherwise. Her holding is thus limited with respect to income, but 
does not appear limited to constitutional cases. The dissent in Carten also made his holding limited: 
McEachern C.J.C. held that the tax was unconstitutional because it applied to litigation involving 
the enforcement of constitutional rights, as well as other litigation, and concluded that it did 
constitute a minimal impairment, since it “could have been imposed just on legal bills that do not 
relate to the exercise or protection of guaranteed rights”: John Carten Personal Law Corp., supra, 
note 11, at para. 101 (B.C.C.A.). 
21
  Christie v. British Columbia, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2745, 262 D.L.R. (4th) 51, at para. 41 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Christie (B.C.C.A.)”]. 
22
  Id., at para. 30. 
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the Canadian justice system. Some of them decide to become their own 
lawyers. Our courtrooms today are filled with litigants who are not 
represented by counsel, trying to navigate the sometimes complex 
demands of law and procedure. Others simply give up. Recently, the 
Chief Justice of Ontario stated that access to justice is the most 
important issue facing the legal system.23   
Yet in Christie, a decision of “The Court”, the Supreme Court 
rejected the opportunity to alleviate, to at least some degree, the problem 
identified by the Chief Justice. Having defined the issue as a general 
right to counsel, the Court pointed out that a constitutional right to legal 
services as a means to access to justice would apply to those who did not 
have difficulty accessing legal services, such as corporations, as well as 
all aspects of legal services, including advice. Thus  
the logical result would be a constitutionally mandated legal aid 
scheme for virtually all legal proceedings, except where the state could 
show this is not necessary for effective access to justice.24   
It would be, the Court imagines, costly (“a not inconsiderable burden 
on taxpayers”),25 since there are already many unrepresented litigants 
and, even worse, if they did not have to fund their own cases, other 
persons would bring lawsuits who would not do so if funded 
representation were not available.  
Compared to cases such as G. (J.), in which Lamer C.J.C. went to 
considerable effort to limit his decision,26 in Christie, the Court went 
beyond the narrow confines of the case (the validity of charging a tax on 
legal fees) to deliver the message that it does not believe that there is a 
broad constitutional right to paid legal representation, although there 
may be a more circumscribed right, as in criminal law or in Crown 
custody proceedings.27 It takes this approach despite recognizing that 
                                                                                                             
23
  “The Challenge We Face”, Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., 
presented at the Empire Club of Canada (Toronto: March 8, 2007), online at: <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe.dis/bm07-03-08-eng.asp>. The Chief Justice’s reference to the Chief 
Justice of Ontario’s comments comes from Tracey Tyler, “The Dark Side of Justice”, Toronto Star, 
March 3, 2007. Melina Buckley refers more extensively to judicial ex curia statements about the 
importance of legal representation for access to justice in “Searching for the Constitutional Core of 
Access to Justice” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 567. 
24
  Christie, supra, note 3, at para. 13. 
25
  Id., at para. 14. 
26
  New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”]. 
27
  In both cases, state-funded legal representation may be provided if required for a fair 
trial, but only if the trial judge cannot provide sufficient assistance without becoming too 
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Christie’s concern was about access to the legal system by persons of 
low income.28 It describes Christie’s claim as being “for effective access 
to the courts which, he states, necessitates legal services. This is asserted 
not on a case-by-case basis, but as a general right” to “access aided by a 
lawyer”.29 In these cases, since the individual must show that he or she 
requires the assistance, the onus does not lie on the state to show that the 
individual does not require it, as the Court fears would result from a 
more broadly exercised right.30 
The relationship between and among the Charter’s rights and 
freedoms requires careful consideration. As the Court has noted, in some 
ways the rights and freedoms are linked to each other. Thus “notions of 
human dignity underlie almost every right guaranteed by the Charter”.31 
Although “dignity” should not be treated as a distinctive right, it is an 
“underlying value”.32 It is not unreasonable, therefore, to read the rights 
and freedoms as incorporating the concept of dignity or, at least, being 
informed by it. One might expect that this shared commitment would 
result in the rights overlapping to some extent, rather than treating the 
rights as silos. In Christie, the Court “reads down” the Charter by 
approaching the rights as separate and distinct elements. Thus section 
10(b) would be “redundant” if there were a general right to counsel. One 
might argue that section 10(b) addresses the criminal context with its 
different demands and expectations and is about “retaining” counsel (not 
about who pays for it) and, importantly, about being informed of that 
right. Still, the Court is not suggesting that section 10(b) is the only 
provision addressing the right to counsel, for it points to section 7’s 
guarantee, as interpreted, of “a right to counsel as an aspect of 
procedural fairness where life, liberty and security of the person are 
affected”, albeit through “a case-specific multi-factored enquiry”.33  
                                                                                                             
interventionist. In criminal cases, factors such as the economic and educational circumstances of the 
accused, the seriousness of the charge and potential penalty, the complexity and length of the trial 
and the reason why legal aid was denied are taken into account: R. v. Rowbotham, [1988] O.J. No. 
271, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rain, [1998] A.J. No. 1059, 1998 ABCA 315 (Alta. C.A.). 
In child protection proceedings, the seriousness of the interest at stake, the complexity of the 
proceedings and the capacities of the parent must be considered: G. (J.), supra, note 26, at para. 75.  
28
  Christie, supra, note 3, at paras. 3-5.  
29
  Id., at para. 10. 
30
  Id., at para. 13. 
31
  Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”]. 
32
  Id., at para. 78. 
33
  Christie, supra, note 3, at paras. 24-25. 
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The Court has considered the relationship between the different 
guarantees and the Charter as a whole in a number of decisions. While 
some judges have suggested that the guarantees should be interpreted as 
discretely as possible, the more widely held view is that the Charter is a 
holistic document and that it should also be interpreted in conjunction 
with the unwritten normative principles.  
The opinions in B. (R.) v. Metropolitan Toronto Children’s Aid 
illustrate the different approaches.34 Chief Justice Lamer preferred to 
maintain the guarantees within relatively strict boundaries. For example, 
he defined “liberty” in section 7 narrowly as referring to physical 
movement. He viewed section 7’s protection as limited to the loss of 
physical liberty as a result of the operation of the legal system because 
he believed that section 2, among other provisions, encompassed other 
forms of liberty: 
… I am unable to believe that the framers would have limited the types 
of fundamental freedoms to which they intended to extend 
constitutional protection in such explicit terms, in s. 2, and then, in s. 7, 
conferred “general” protection by using a generic expression which 
would, unless its meaning were limited, include the freedoms already 
protected by ss. 2 and 6, as well as all freedoms that were not listed. 
This approach is clearly contrary to the principles of legislative 
drafting that require that a general provision be placed before the 
provisions for its specific application. Moreover, if s. 7 were to include 
any type of freedom whatever, provided that it could be described as 
fundamental, we might seriously question the need for and purpose of 
s. 2. Either it is redundant, or s. 7 should then be considered to be a 
residual provision so that we can make up for anything that Parliament 
may have left out.35   
Justice La Forest, on the other hand, maintained that  
liberty does not mean mere freedom from physical restraint. In a free 
and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal 
autonomy to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of 
fundamental personal importance …36  
including “the [parental] right to nurture a child, to care for its 
development, and to make decisions for it in fundamental matters such 
                                                                                                             
34
  B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.). 
35
  Id., at 343. 
36
  Id., at 370. 
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as medical care”.37 In G. (J.),38 Lamer C.J.C. declined to consider 
whether G. (J.)’s section 7 liberty interest had been contravened, since 
he concluded that her security interest had been infringed and that her 
treatment was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.39 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, with whom Gonthier and McLachlin 
JJ. (as she then was) agreed, found a liberty violation, as well, agreeing 
with the broader understanding of liberty expressed in other decisions.40 
The Court has adopted the broader interpretation. In Blencoe, for 
example, Bastarache J., speaking for the majority, endorsed the view that 
the liberty interest encompassed personal autonomy and the freedom to 
make fundamental life decisions.41 In Christie, the Court seems to have 
resuscitated the narrower view about the nature of Charter guarantees, 
one akin to the “watertight compartments” of the old federalism 
jurisprudence. 
Chief Justice Dickson established some of the basic interpretative 
principles for the Charter in Big M Drug Mart and these have not been 
subsequently disowned, except perhaps by a failure to abide by them. 
There he said that one of the factors to be considered in determining the 
meaning of a right or freedom is reference, “where applicable”, to “the 
meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which 
it is associated within the text of the Charter”. One might read this as 
ensuring that “associated” rights and freedoms are given as different an 
interpretation and scope as possible. Yet this rigid approach is inconsistent 
with other principles of constitutional interpretation. For example, one 
principle is that interpretation of the constitution “should be … generous 
rather than … legalistic” and one that should be “aimed at fulfilling the 
purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the 
Charter’s protection”, as long as it does not overshoot the mark.42 Even 
when the Charter explicitly guarantees a right, it does not mean that a 
similar or related right might not be found in another section, intended to 
address a different context. This is consistent with an evolutionary 
approach to Charter interpretation that recognizes that the framers could 
not have contemplated all forms a right would take or all contexts that 
might attract the application of a right in the future: in short, the “living 
                                                                                                             
37
  Id.  
38
  G. (J.), supra, note 26. 
39
  Id., at para. 56. 
40
  Id., at paras. 117-18. 
41
  Blencoe, supra, note 31, at paras. 49ff. 
42
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.). 
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tree” approach, in contrast to a “frozen rights” approach.43 A nuanced 
approach to interpreting the guarantees does not mean that each 
guarantee becomes meaningless, although it does mean that interpreting 
the constitution may be a somewhat more complex task. 
Regardless of whether the Court is prepared to extend rights, it 
should consider whether its approach might diminish rights already 
recognized. The Christie Court does not consider how the imposition of 
a tax on legal services affects the ability of litigants to take advantage of 
the Charter’s section 10(b) and section 7 guarantees relating to the right 
to legal representation, particularly as recognized in section 7. It would 
be necessary to show that the interests affected in the civil action involve 
the right to liberty or security and that the imposition of the surcharge 
does prevent access and that it is inconsistent with substantive 
administration of justice.44 Admittedly, this might stretch the interpretation 
of section 7 beyond where the Court has taken it to date, but it is 
appropriate that the Court at least consider how new developments 
impact rights already acknowledged. One cannot assume that if the tax 
prohibits private representation, the litigant will simply fall into the 
category of those warranting state-funded legal counsel. 
Christie challenges the Court’s view of the rule of law and its 
willingness to treat the unwritten principles as substantive principles. 
Justice Newbury, for the majority at the Court of Appeal, placed this 
claim within the context of   
the interplay between unwritten principles and written provisions, 
between lofty descriptions of the fundamental nature of the rule of law 
and the courts’ traditional deference to parliamentary supremacy.45   
As Newbury J.A. explained, after ringing expressions of the 
importance of the unwritten principles, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
narrowed its view of the rule of law to one of procedure and has treated 
the significance of the principles less seriously.  
The courts below treated the rule of law expansively, depending in 
part on Dickson C.J.C.’s comments in British Columbia Government 
                                                                                                             
43
  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.): “[A 
constitution] must … be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political 
and historical realities often unimagined by its framers.”  
44
  Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Act”]. 
45
  Christie (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 21, at para. 28. 
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Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Attorney General).46 There the 
Chief Justice of British Columbia had, on his own motion, issued an 
injunction against the picketing of the province’s courthouses as part of a 
legal strike by the courthouse employees. In upholding the injunction 
and the finding that the picketers would have been in criminal contempt 
had they continued to picket, Dickson C.J.C. emphasized the importance 
of access to the courts and implied that this refers not only to physical 
access, but also more generally. He stated, “[t]here cannot be a rule of 
law without access, otherwise the rule of law is replaced by a rule of 
men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have access to 
justice.”47 He adopted the Court of Appeal’s observation in that case that 
[W]e have no doubt that the right to access to the courts is under 
the rule of law one of the foundational pillars protecting the rights and 
freedoms of our citizens. It is the preservation of that right with which 
we are concerned in this case. Any action that interferes with such 
access by any person or groups of persons will rally the court’s powers 
to ensure the citizen of his or her day in court. Here, the action causing 
interference happens to be picketing. As we have already indicated, 
interference from whatever source falls into the same category.48  
Justice Southin, dissenting in Christie at the Court of Appeal, stated 
that  
the words “rule of law” in the preamble [to the Charter] do not create 
any substantive independent ground upon which a court can find duly 
enacted legislation to be “inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution” and therefore of no force and effect.49 
Having chosen to frame the issue differently from the more 
contextual way it was articulated by the lower courts, as a general 
constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with 
the dissent in the Court of Appeal:  
We conclude that the text of the Constitution, the jurisprudence 
and the historical understanding of the rule of law do not foreclose the 
possibility that a right to counsel may be recognized in specific and 
varied situations. But at the same time, they do not support the 
conclusion that there is a general constitutional right to counsel in 
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  [1988] S.C.J. No. 76, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (S.C.C.). 
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  Id., at para. 25. 
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  Id., at para. 26, citing Re British Columbia Government Employees’ Union, [1985] B.C.J. 
No. 1939, 20 D.L.R. (4th) 399, at para. 46 (B.C.C.A.). 
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proceedings before courts and tribunals dealing with rights and 
obligations.50 
Referring to the three components of the rule of law it identified in 
the Reference re Manitoba Language Rights51 and Reference re 
Secession of Quebec,52 the Court pointed out that they do not include 
“general access to legal services”, although the list of three is not 
exhaustive. In the Court’s view, legal representation is only one way in 
which litigants may gain “effective” access to the courts or, more 
broadly, “access to justice”. Significantly, it refers to legal services as “a 
particular type of access to justice”.53 Yet the Court also refers to the 
importance of lawyers in the legal system and the constitutional 
recognition given to the role played by lawyers in some situations, 
stating that “[a]ccess to legal services is fundamentally important in any 
free and democratic society”.54  
In Christie, the Supreme Court not only declined to treat the rule of 
law as a separate grounding for constitutional rights, but also failed to 
use this unwritten principle as a way of reading the written text. It 
accepted the limited vision of the rule of law posed by the dissent in the 
Court of Appeal.55 The unwritten principles are not meant to be 
interpreted in a static manner any more than are the written provisions. 
While not exactly taking a “frozen rights” approach to the interpretation 
of the rule of law, the Court points out that “historically” it encompassed 
only “a limited right that extended only, if at all, to representation in the 
criminal context”.56 The Court has cautioned against a “frozen rights” 
approach since the earliest of Charter cases57 and the Court in Christie 
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  Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). 
51
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  Christie (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 21, at para. 22. 
56
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  See, e.g., B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 44, at para. 53 and, more recently, with 
respect to the common law, Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 
698, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). One might usefully compare Reference re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) with Dunmore v. Ontario 
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Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) for examples of the Court’s willingness to expand its 
understanding of a guarantee. The Court has drawn back from its expansive appreciation of the 
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did acknowledge that the rule of law might support a right to counsel in 
limited situations, acknowledging, indeed, that Imperial Tobacco left 
open the possibility that the rule of law had more than the three 
elements,58 but it almost precluded applying that approach in Christie by 
the way that it defined Christie’s claim. 
Christie59 highlights the difference between the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s aspirational statements about the importance of access to 
justice, including, moreover, the significance of lawyers in securing 
access, and its reluctance to play a significant role in securing access 
when it might be in tension with a limited view of the extent it should 
impose financial obligations on the legislature. The case does not bode 
well for further attempts to establish a broad constitutional right to legal 
representation, particularly since Christie is a decision by “the Court” 
and a full Bench, at that. The lesson of Christie is that it will be 
necessary to develop the jurisprudence and access to the legal system on 
a case-by-case basis, with the context to which the right to legal 
representation applies defined narrowly.  
2. Private and Public Interests: What Counts?  
While Christie was about basic access to the legal system for 
ordinary litigants, the capacity of a party to litigate public interest 
constitutional challenges arose in Little Sisters (No. 2).60 The Little 
Sisters bookstore wanted advance costs in order to continue its fight 
against what it considered discriminatory conduct by Canada Customs in 
not allowing certain books to cross the border, relying on British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band61 for its claim. 
In the view of Bastarache and LeBel JJ., speaking for the majority, the 
circumstances facing Little Sisters did not meet the stringent test applied 
in Okanagan: “where a court would be participating in an injustice — 
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  Christie, id. 
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  Little Sisters (No. 2), [2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38 (S.C.C.).  
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  [2003] S.C.J. No. 76, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Okanagan Indian 
Band”]. 
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against the litigant personally and against the public generally — if it did 
not order advance costs to allow the litigant to proceed”.62  
After the bookstore’s partial victory in Little Sisters (No. 1),63 
Customs continued to detain books destined for the bookstore and in 
Little Sisters (No. 2), the bookstore requested the injunction refused in 
the first case, as well as “[s]pecial or increased costs”.64 In addition to 
appealing the detention of four books in two separate Customs 
determinations, Little Sisters argued that Little Sisters (No. 1) had not 
remedied the “systemic problems” in the way Canada Customs 
approached the determination of whether books entering Canada are 
obscene; therefore, a broader challenge was required and Little Sisters 
bookstore was prepared to bring the challenge.65  
Thus in addition to appealing Customs’ detention of four books 
(“The Four Books Appeal”), Little Sisters asked for a systemic finding 
that Customs be prevented from applying the impugned provisions to 
itself or, indeed, “to anyone”, “until such time as the Court is satisfied 
that the unconstitutional administration will cease”.66 It requested 
advance costs after the release of Okanagan.  
In Okanagan, members of four Indian Bands engaged in 
unauthorized logging on Crown land in British Columbia were issued 
with stop-work orders. The Bands claimed title to the land and 
maintained that they had a right to log. They also argued that if the 
matter were to go to trial, they did not have the resources necessary to 
mount the kind of case required and thus requested advance fees and 
costs “in any event of the cause”. Speaking for the majority of six 
judges, Lebel J. accepted that the bands were in poor financial 
circumstances. Although costs had been traditionally used to indemnify 
the winning party, Lebel J. noted that “it has become a routine matter for 
courts to employ the power to order costs as a tool in the furtherance of 
the efficient and orderly administration of justice”.67 More recently, the 
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  Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60, at para. 5. 
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  Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 
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courts have recognized that the awarding of costs “helps to ensure that 
ordinary citizens have access to the justice system when they seek to 
resolve matters of consequence to the community as a whole”, even 
when parties making constitutional challenges fail.68  
Although interim or advance costs have been ordered in a wide 
range of cases, for a court to exercise its discretion to order the costs, the 
case must meet three criteria: the litigant must be unable to pursue the 
litigation because of impecuniosity without the costs award; the case 
must have “sufficient merit to warrant pursuit”; and “there must be 
special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that the case is within 
the narrow class of cases where this extraordinary exercise of its powers 
is appropriate”.69 A case may be “special” because it is a public interest 
case70 and concerns that awarding costs is effectively prejudging the 
outcome of a case are “attenuated” if costs would be awarded regardless 
of whether the litigant was successful.71 Justice Lebel also identified a 
number of factors to ensure that costs remain reasonable, that a litigant is 
not encouraged to engage in additional litigation and that the award does 
not operate unfairly on other parties.72  
Justice Lebel found that all the criteria were met in Okanagan. In 
particular, he found that the claim of title and logging rights  
are of profound importance to the people of British Columbia, both 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal, and their determination would be a 
major step towards settling the many unresolved problems in the 
Crown-aboriginal relationship in that province. In short, the 
circumstances of this case are indeed special, even extreme.73  
The dissent in Okanagan maintained that the awarding of interim 
costs should be left to the trial judge, not awarded by appellate courts, 
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and that the majority’s decision constituted a significant extension of the 
principles governing the awarding of discretionary costs.74 The dissent 
also emphasized that in matrimonial cases, where interim costs are often 
awarded, it is presumed that there will be some distribution of the assets 
between both parties, not that one party will “lose” in the usual sense.75 
It is possibly noteworthy that the majority decision in Little Sisters 
(No. 2) is written by both Lebel J., who wrote the majority judgment in 
Okanagan, and Bastarache J., who dissented in Okanagan.76 The 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Little Sisters (No. 2) 
concluded that the issues raised there did not rise to the level of public 
interest warranting interim or advance costs.77 For them, Okanagan had 
now become a case in which “[t]he bands had been thrust into complex 
litigation against the government that they could not pay for, and the 
case raised issues vital both to their survival and to the government’s 
approach to aboriginal rights.”78 The majority obviously sees Little 
Sisters’ interests as individual and private, interests that do not meet the 
Court’s articulation of the Okanagan test of whether “a court would be 
participating in an injustice — against the litigant personally and against 
the public generally — if it did not order advance costs to allow the 
litigant to proceed”.79  
The majority sought to diminish the precedential value of Okanagan, 
by describing the circumstances in that case as “[a]n exceptional 
convergence of factors”: the bands could not afford litigation, especially 
given their other needs, particularly housing; but if they did not continue 
to log, they would not be able to build the houses; and it was in the 
public interest to resolve the way in which land claims would be 
resolved. Therefore, the Court “held that the public’s interest in the 
litigation justified a structured advance costs order insofar as it was 
necessary to have the case move forward”.80 Okanagan, the majority in 
Little Sisters (No. 2) maintained, was an “evolutionary step, but not a 
revolution”, in the awarding of interim costs.81 (Justice Bastarache had 
not distanced himself in his concurrence with Major J.’s dissenting 
                                                                                                             
74
  Id., at paras. 54-55 (per Major J.). 
75
  Id., at para. 74. 
76
  Id. 
77
  Little Sisters (No. 2), supra, note 60. 
78
  Id., at para. 2. 
79
  Id., at para. 5. 
80
  Id., at para. 33. 
81
  Id., at para. 34. 
534 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
opinion in Okanagan with Major J.’s comment that Okanagan was a 
significant change in the interim costs rules).82  
The majority cautioned that the awarding of interim or advance costs 
for public interest cases (“public interest advance costs orders”) is “to 
remain special and, as a result, exceptional” and is to occur only “as a 
last resort”.83 Thus:  
[a]n application for advance costs may be entertained only if a litigant 
establishes that it is impossible to proceed with the trial and await its 
conclusion, and if the court is in a position to allocate the financial 
burden of the litigation fairly between the parties.84 
Litigants seeking advance costs must show that they cannot obtain the 
required funding through alternative means; if there are other ways of 
resolving the matter, it is not an injustice to deny the costs for a trial; and 
the use of the costs must be scrutinized.85  
The main distinction between Okanagan and Little Sisters (No. 2) is 
that the Court concluded that the issues in Okanagan are of significant 
public interest regardless of the outcome because the outcome will 
identify a method by which land claims can be addressed, while the 
constitutionality of Customs’ practices will be of public interest only if 
the outcome is that Customs has behaved unconstitutionally.86 As with 
Christie, the framing of the case inevitably influences the conclusions 
reached by the judges. In Christie, the contrast in the articulation about 
what was at stake in the case arose from a comparison between the lower 
courts and the Supreme Court; in Little Sisters (No. 2), the contrast is 
found in the differences between the majority and dissenting opinions.87  
The majority, as well as McLachlin C.J.C., Charron J. concurring, 
who agreed on the outcome, treated Little Sisters (No. 2) only minimally 
as a continuation of Little Sisters (No. 1). They focused on applying the 
test more or less to the circumstances underlying Little Sisters (No. 2) 
rather than as significantly informed by Little Sisters (No. 1). This 
becomes more obvious when these judgments are compared to Binnie 
J.’s dissent (in which Fish J. concurred) in Little Sisters (No. 2). The 
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majority bifurcated the Four Books Appeal and the Systemic Review to 
make the Four Books Appeal effectively a private business matter for 
Little Sisters, while finding that there was no supporting evidence for the 
Systemic Review.  
Justice Binnie, in contrast, stated, “This fight is not just about four 
books. As was the case in Little Sisters No. 1, the real fight is about 
alleged systemic discrimination exemplified by the Four Books 
Appeal.”88 This is so, even though he rejected Little Sisters attempt to 
use the Systemic Review itself as, in effect, a “privately initiated public 
enquiry” or “a sort of informal class action”.89 He continued:  
The government is in effect being accused of fighting a war of 
attrition. Today four books, tomorrow another four books. Litigation 
follows litigation until the rational businessperson is forced to throw in 
the towel. This is how civil liberties can be eroded, little by little, 
yielded in small increments that case by case are not worth the cost of 
the right. It takes an unbusinesslike litigant like Little Sisters to elbow 
aside purely financial considerations (to the extent it can) and carry on 
what is sees as unfinished Charter business against the government. 
Having done so successfully and at its own expense in Little Sisters 
No. 1, it asks the court for an exceptional order of advance costs to 
make good the victory it thought it had won in Little Sisters No. 1. 
Little Sisters may be right or it may be wrong in its allegations, but its 
motive can hardly be financial, and its claim to advance costs should 
not be assessed on that basis.90   
Justice Binnie considered that Little Sisters (No. 2) had reached the 
required level of “special case” (it was sufficiently special) in large 
measure because of Little Sisters (No. 1).91 Justice Binnie also noted that 
although the majority in Okanagan maintained that the trial judge is 
responsible for determining whether a case is “special enough” to 
warrant interim costs, in Little Sisters (No. 2), the majority rejected the 
trial judge’s finding on this point and that “in both cases to reach this 
Court on the advance costs issue, the trial court has been reversed.”92 
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By characterizing Christie’s claim more broadly than Christie 
himself seemed to intend, the Court was apparently more justified in 
denying that the rule of law requires that at least some litigants (in 
addition to those already specified in previous cases) should have access 
to state-funded counsel.93 By characterizing Little Sisters’ claim more 
narrowly than Little Sisters intended, the majority of the Court were 
apparently more justified in refusing Little Sisters advanced costs.94  
3.  Official Intermeddler or Civic-Minded Citizen?  
We usually see access to justice realized through the extension of 
rights or increased participation. It is not clear that that is always the 
case, however. For example, in Alliance for Marriage and Family v. 
A. (A.),95 LeBel J. dismissed the Alliance’s attempt to gain party status in 
order to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal in a case in which it 
had been an intervenor. 
While not itself a constitutional case, A. (A.) v. B. (B.),96 the case in 
which the Alliance intervened, involved a Charter challenge at the Court 
of Appeal (since it was raised there first, the Court refused to consider it) 
and granting status would have left open the prospect of third parties 
appealing constitutional cases in which the constitutional issues had been 
raised in private litigation, a common way for these issues to arise. In the 
original case, B.B. was father to a child of whom C.C. was the mother 
and A.A., C.C.’s lesbian partner, considered herself and was considered 
by B.B., C.C. and the child also to be the child’s mother. A.A. sought a 
declaration that she was a parent. The application judge dismissed the 
application on the basis that the governing legislation97 did not 
contemplate this parenting dynamic, but the Court of Appeal declared 
A.A. to be the child’s parent under its parens patriae jurisdiction, 
declining to deal with the Charter issues because they had not been 
raised previously.98 While public interest plaintiffs may raise constitutional 
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questions that otherwise would not be addressed,99 the Court maintained 
the position that it is inappropriate for a third party to “revive” litigation 
between private parties: 
What the applicant is attempting to do is to substitute itself for the 
Attorney General in order to bring important legal questions relating to 
the development and application of the law before this Court. As we 
have seen, neither the Attorney General nor the immediate parties 
intend, for reasons of their own, to contest the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment. The applicant is certainly concerned about the impact of that 
judgment. Nevertheless, it was merely an intervener in the Court of 
Appeal, there to defend its view of the development of family law, but 
it had no specific interest in the outcome of the litigation.100  
It might be argued that justice does not require that the Alliance be 
allowed to import interests into what is admittedly a private matter with 
a public component. It was sufficient that its intervenor status allowed it 
to present policy reasons why the court should refuse A.A.’s request to 
be declared the child’s parent at the Court of Appeal. Beyond that, the 
Alliance had no interest in the case that warranted overriding the parties’ 
decision about how to proceed. It may be significant, however, that the 
Alliance had not shown that it satisfied the requirements for public 
interest standing, particularly coupled with characterizing the litigation 
as, in essence, a private matter in which the Alliance had no “specific 
personal interest in the outcome”.101 
4. The Secular Legal System, Equality and Religion: Porous or 
Solid Borders?  
Bruker v. Marcovitz is, from one perspective, simply about when 
someone may use the legal system to enforce a contract. From another, 
however, it is a case about how members of minority groups gain access 
to justice in the mainstream when the group adheres to tenets that are 
inconsistent with mainstream values.102 
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Bruker v. Marcovitz involved a question of religious freedom under 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,103 a quasi-
constitutional document, and thus gives us a sense of how the matter 
would be approached had the same matter been raised under the 
Canadian Charter, as was the case in Amselem.104 In Amselem, Jewish 
owners of condominiums wanted to build succahs on their balconies, 
contrary to the corporation’s by-law that the balconies be kept clear. 
They successfully challenged the by-law under the Quebec Charter on 
the basis that it infringed their religious freedom. 
Speaking for the majority in Bruker v. Marcovitz, Abella J. noted 
that “Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for 
diversity and pluralism”, but that “[n]ot all differences are compatible 
with Canada’s fundamental values”.105 If access to justice is viewed as 
access to full participation in and benefit from not only Canada’s legal 
system, but also Canada’s commitment to particular norms and values, 
as mediated by the legal system, then the courts have a major role to play 
in determining how this objective is manifested. Bruker v. Marcovitz is 
about how the courts enforce Canada’s commitment to pluralism: here 
the issue is the tension between religious beliefs and practices and sex 
equality. One might also consider it to be a case about whether 
individuals more appropriately gain access to justice through secular or 
religious institutions, when the bar to justice is religious.  
After her divorce from Jason Marcovitz, Stephanie Bruker wanted to 
remarry in a religious ceremony, but could not do so because her former 
husband would not grant her a get, an act within his control under Jewish 
religious law (it would be within the wife’s control to refuse the get). 
Without the get, she remained his wife and if she did remarry in a civil 
ceremony, her children would be “illegitimate” under Jewish law. In 
1990, the Divorce Act was amended to encourage a party to remove a 
barrier to religious remarriage within the party’s control.106 Failure to do 
so could result in the court’s exercising discretion not to grant the 
recalcitrant party relief under the Divorce Act; an exception provided 
that if the party refused because of genuine religious or conscientious 
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reasons, the court could not exercise its discretion to refuse the party’s 
request for relief.107  
In the settlement of the issues arising out of the end of their 
marriage, Ms Bruker and Mr. Marcovitz agreed to attend before a 
rabbinical court to obtain the get. For 15 years, Mr. Marcovitz refused to 
abide by the agreement on the basis that his freedom of religion meant 
that he did not have to do so. Ms Bruker argued that she had considered 
the get in negotiating the terms of their agreement around the issues 
arising from the end of their marriage and sought damages for Mr. 
Marcovitz’s failure to provide the get.108 She did not request that the 
court compel Mr. Marcovitz to provide the get. Accordingly, while this 
case may be about freedom of religion with a subtext of equality, it is 
also about conforming to a voluntarily made contract. 
For Abella J., as long as the contract is valid, its religious element 
does not make it non-justiciable, the position Deschamps J. (Charron J. 
concurring) took in her dissent.109 While the courts have generally (but 
not always) taken a “hands-off” approach to adjudicating internal church 
disputes, this has not been the case when the rights of an individual to 
claim a legal remedy have been met with objections based on religion. 
The guiding principle is that courts seek to avoid adjudicating religious 
doctrine.110 In Abella J.’s view, this case did not require consideration of 
religious doctrine because it was simply about the refusal of one party to 
abide by a contract into which he voluntarily entered, even though the 
substance of the contract involved a religious practice.  
Underlying Abella J.’s treatment of the issue is her position that the 
husband translated a religious practice and a moral duty into a legal 
obligation.111 The husband sought to avoid the contract by arguing that 
its enforcement would be against public order, since it contravened his 
freedom of religion.112 Justice Deschamps, on the other hand, asserted 
that “the undertaking to appear before the rabbinical authorities for a 
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religious divorce, like an undertaking to go regularly to church, to 
synagogue or to a mosque, is based on a duty of conscience alone”. The 
undertaking is “purely a moral obligation that may not be enforced 
civilly”.113 
In Abella J.’s opinion, Mr. Marcovitz’s agreement to provide the get 
was actually consistent with public order and the relationship between 
equality and religious freedom reflected in the Divorce Act.114 
Furthermore, his reason for refusing to provide the get was not because 
he had a religious objection to it, but because he “was angry at Ms. 
Bruker”, a crucial finding in the case for the majority.115 More broadly, 
and less dependent on the existence of the contract, “[t]he refusal of a 
husband to provide a get … arbitrarily denies his wife access to a 
remedy she independently has under Canadian law and denies her the 
ability to remarry and get on with her life in accordance with her 
religious beliefs.”116 It is not insignificant that the husband’s refusal to 
provide the get had a major impact on Ms Bruker’s life precisely 
because she chose to conform to her religious beliefs that without the 
get, she could not remarry or have legitimate children under Jewish law. 
Although there are hints in the majority judgment that a refusal to give a 
get, absent an agreement to provide one, would result in damages in the 
appropriate case, it is far less likely that the court would require a 
husband to provide a get or even appear before a rabbinical court to 
request one.  
In awarding damages to Ms Bruker for the breach of the contract by 
Mr. Marcovitz, the majority concluded that the claiming of religious 
grounds by the party seeking to renege on the contract did not override 
the other party’s access to the legal system to enforce the contract. In 
other words, Ms Bruker was not denied access to justice because Mr. 
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Marcovitz raised a religious objection to meeting his agreement. 
Limiting the remedy to damages (the remedy Ms Bruker requested) 
rather than enforcing the performance of the contract by requiring Mr. 
Marcovitz to appear before the rabbinical court, meant that the Court 
was not compelling him to take a “religious step”. It minimized the role 
religion played in the agreement and in effect characterized the 
agreement as a promise to take certain action, action which happened to 
have religious significance.  
Justice Deschamps in dissent focused on the religious significance of 
the promise (it was not merely a promise but a promise of a particular 
kind) and on the religious consequences of the failure to abide by the 
promise. Religion is the core of the matter, not a happenstance. It is the 
core because Ms Bruker’s reasons for wanting the get were religious, to 
enable her to live a religious life. Nothing prevented Ms Bruker 
marrying in a civil ceremony, but that would not be “remarriage” for her. 
Similarly, the law makes no distinction between children born within or 
outside wedlock. For Ms Bruker, however, children of a civil marriage 
would be illegitimate without the get. Although implicit in both 
opinions, both Abella and Deschamps JJ. avoided making an explicit 
statement about the equality ramifications of the get. Only the man is 
able to provide the get and only the husband can therefore limit the 
wife’s future by denying it to her. The wife can refuse to accept the get 
and therefore prevent the husband’s remarrying in a religious ceremony 
but, while this falls within the provisions of the Divorce Act, it is not 
the reason the Divorce Act was amended. The Divorce Act provisions, 
in the context of the get, are directed at the possibility of an abusive 
use of the husband’s power over the wife’s future through the get. 
On its face, the dissent seems to say to Ms Bruker, “bad luck”, you 
will be denied access to justice because the impact of your husband’s 
refusal to abide by his agreement — a refusal that in the usual case 
would allow you access to the legal system to obtain a remedy — arises 
from religious practice. But this is not what Deschamps J. said that she 
was saying. On the contrary, preventing Ms Bruker from enforcing the 
contract was actually a way to maintain the separation of religion and 
the justice system. Equality could not be advanced by recognizing the 
damage caused by the religious consequences that would occur if the 
contract was not enforced; rather, equality would be advanced by 
treating the religious consequences as outside the system. It was not Ms 
Bruker’s access to justice that mattered; it was ensuring that the system 
providing access to justice was not tainted by religious considerations. 
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Far from condemning the inequality that flowed from the get, the 
dissent reinforced it under the guise of taking an arm’s length approach. 
Justice Deschamps framed the issue as “whether the civil courts can be 
used not only as a shield to protect freedom of religion, but also as a 
weapon to sanction a religious undertaking”.117 In her view, the majority 
“sanction[ed] the religious consequences of delaying consent for a get 
signif[ying] that it endorses those consequences even if they are contrary 
to the hard-won gains (aquis) of Canadian society”.118 Only when a 
religious undertaking (such as a religious marriage contract) meets the 
requirements for a civil contract, should the courts enforce the remedial 
provisions of the contract; they should not, however, give a remedy for 
the religious consequences of the failure to abide by the contract. For 
Deschamps J., this case falls into the latter category, since not being able 
to remarry or have legitimate children are consequences determined by 
religion.119  
Significantly, Deschamps J. did not accept that the contract entered 
into by the parties constituted a contract under Quebec law, because it 
did not have as its object a “juridical act”. Here the object was the 
obtaining of a religious divorce, an object “not capable of legal 
characterization” or of juridical consequences, since the rabbinical 
authorities do not play the same role as religious authorities may in 
marriage: their rulings do not acquire civil status. Accordingly, 
Deschamps J. concluded that “one of the essential elements of contract 
formation is missing” and the agreement to attend at the rabbinical court 
to obtain a religious divorce is “purely a moral obligation that may not 
be enforced civilly”.120  
Justice Deschamps maintained that the ground of damages is not 
recognized in Canadian or Quebec law: the religious consequences of the 
husband’s not providing the get are not consistent with the civil law 
which provides that a woman does not require her husband’s consent to 
remarry and that children are treated equally whether born into a 
marriage or not. Thus to award damages is to sanction the religious law 
and thus “impose a rule that is inconsistent with the rights the secular 
courts are otherwise responsible for enforcing”121 or, phrased even more 
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strongly, “the assessment of damages would require the court to 
implement a rule of religious law that is not within its jurisdiction and 
that violates the secular law it is constitutionally responsible for 
applying”.122 Justice Deschamps described as a “clear rule” the principle 
that “religion is not an autonomous source of law in Canada”123 and that 
it is crucial that the state be neutral with regard to religion.124  
For the majority, the issue is far simpler: 
The promise by Mr. Marcovitz to remove the religious barriers to 
remarriage by providing a get was negotiated between two consenting 
adults, each represented by counsel, as part of a voluntary exchange of 
commitments intended to have legally enforceable consequences. This 
puts the obligation appropriately under a judicial microscope.125   
Yet it is also true that not only did the husband claim that religion lay 
behind his refusal to abide by the contract (a religious belief that did not 
prevent his making the contract initially and a position the majority did 
not accept), but that the wife also maintained that her desire to enforce 
the contract lay in her religious belief (a claim about which the dissent 
seems skeptical). Assuming that both parties were stating their positions 
in good faith, the majority sanctioned one party’s commitment to her 
religious tenets while disregarding the religious belief of the other, since 
the damages are premised on the wife’s inability to pursue a “normal” 
life following divorce, but a normal life under Jewish law. Justice Abella 
was able to do this in part because she took Ms Bruker’s profession of 
belief at face value, while questioning Mr. Marcovitz’s, but more 
significantly, she removed religion from the equation or, at least, she 
avoided compelling a “religious action”. Ms Bruker then was granted 
“access to justice”. Justice Deschamps placed religion front and centre, 
on the other hand, permitting her to treat it outside the secular legal 
system. As a result, she would have denied Ms Bruker the opportunity to 
obtain damages for Mr. Marcovitz’s failure to grant her the right she 
thought she had acquired through her agreement with him. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In Christie and Little Sisters (No. 2), the Court has staked its position 
in the ongoing problem of the financial difficulties facing litigants. In 
Christie,126 the Court prefered the same rule for litigants having difficulty 
affording a lawyer and corporations: neither may sleep under bridges. 
The majority in Little Sisters (No. 2) recognized that litigants are often in 
an unequal position, but considered that attempting to devise ways of 
addressing this problem, of bringing “an alternative and extensive legal 
aid system into being”, is not their role, since it “would amount to 
imprudent and inappropriate judicial overreach”.127 While it may play a 
crucial role in maintaining the rule of law and in serving as a vehicle by 
which people may enforce rights and obtain justice, the Supreme Court 
views itself as having only a narrowly prescribed role in enhancing 
access or in reducing unequal access to the system necessary for 
individuals to achieve those objectives. Moreover, the Court is not 
willing to be a party to advancing public interest litigation: 
The justice system must not become a proxy for the public inquiry 
process, swamped with actions launched by test plaintiffs and public 
interest groups. As compelling as access to justice concerns may be, 
they cannot justify this Court unilaterally authorizing a revolution in 
how litigation is conceived and conducted.128  
Alliance for Marriage and Family v. A. (A.)129 says that “access to 
justice” does not require giving intervenors with no direct interest in a 
case the opportunity to force the parties to continue a battle that they 
choose not to fight. “Access to justice” does mean that “outsiders” 
cannot prolong a matter, at least in litigation between private parties.  
Finally, while Bruker v. Marcovitz130 appears to engage the Court in 
a religious dispute in a way inconsistent with its general approach to 
religious cases, the facts of the case permit the majority to avoid 
explicitly making a judgment about religious beliefs or enforcing 
religious tenets. In Bruker, both parties share the same religious beliefs, 
beliefs that may appear inherently contrary to the Charter value of 
equality. This case would have been far more difficult for the majority, 
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and easier for the dissent, had Ms Bruker come to the Court asking that 
Mr. Marcovitz obtain a get. Thus the majority’s approach may have less 
value for future cases that explicitly or implicitly pose a tension between 
equality and freedom of religion than does the dissent’s.  
 
 
